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PHILOSOPHY
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WORKSHOP

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NORMS OF COMMUNICATION


**HOW SOCIAL NORMS ENABLE AND DISRUPT
COMMUNICATION**

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
OUTLINE

1 SOCIAL NORMS & COMMUNICATION
Motivating 'Norms of Communication'

2 CASE STUDIES
Conversational Injustice

3 NORM-BASED ANALYSIS
And Practical Implications

4 INTEGRATION
With Previous Analyses






1 SOCIAL NORMS & COMMUNICATION

Motivating 'Norms of Communication'




Reuters





COMMUNICATION

- ▶ **'Classroom Communication Script'**
 - ▶ X lectures, Y raises hand, X calls on Y, Y asks, X answers
- ▶ **What produces this 'normal pattern'?**
 - ▶ What are the social functions of this script?
 - ▶ Hypothesis: manages competing interests of X, Y & others
- ▶ **Motivation:**
 - ▶ 'Normal Variation' vs Deviation
 - ▶ Deviations like Variants 1 & 2 involve speaker pursuing their interests at others' expense
 - ▶ They upset a prescribed equilibrium of interests
- ▶ **Prescribed?**
 - ▶ Are sanctions of X in Variant 1, or Y in Variant 2 justified?
 - ▶ Like: Y not calling on X, or students complaining about Y in evaluations?



QUEUING


- ▶ 'Queuing Script'
 - ▶ Stand behind others, wait, advance
- ▶ What produces this 'normal pattern'?
 - ▶ What is the social function of this script?
 - ▶ Hypothesis: manages competing interests of X, Y & others
- ▶ Motivation:
 - ▶ Variation vs. Violation
 - ▶ Violations arise when agent pursues their interests at others' expense
 - ▶ Violations upset a prescribed 'equilibrium of interests'
- ▶ Prescribed?
 - ▶ Are sanctions of line cutters appropriate?
 - ▶ Like: 'hi! the line starts back there' or 'hey buddy, get in line'.



Reuters

QUEUING AND SOCIAL NORMS

- ▶ Queuing is a social norm
- ▶ Common functionalist picture of social norms:
 - ▶ Social norms are rules for managing conflicting interests to promote 'social goods'
 - ▶ E.g. Durkheim (1892), Ullman-Margalit (1977), Coleman (1990), Hector & Opp (2001)
- ▶ How is this consistent with the oppressive reality of some social norms?
 - ▶ E.g. child marriage, gender violence/hierarchy
 - ▶ More on that later!



ANALYZING SOCIAL NORMS


- ▶ Social norms are an evolved social tech for managing competing interests in society.
- ▶ Self-fulfilling expectations about what people *like us* do in situations *like this*.

SOCIAL NORMS (BICCHIERI 2006, 2017)


- ▶ Social Norms consist in preferences to do A when one believes:
 1. *Empirical*: most of 'us' do A in this situation.
 2. *Normative*: most of 'us' believe we ought to do A in this situation.

QUEUING NORM

- ▶ Consists in preferences to queue when one believes:
 1. *Empirical*: most of 'us' do queue in this situation.
 2. *Normative*: most of 'us' believe we ought to do queue in this situation.



Bicchieri 2017




Bicchieri 2006

FURTHER DETAILS


SOCIAL NORMS (BICCHIERI 2006, 2017)

- ▶ Social Norms consist in preferences to do A when one believes:
 1. Empirical: most of 'us' do A in this situation.
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

- ▶ Action-guiding 'ought': social sanctions (+/-) are justified.
- ▶ Preference: not 'like' or 'desire'; but 'revealed choice behavior'.
- ▶ Effect: discourage self-interested behavior, promote 'collective goods'.
- ▶ Remaining question: where do these preferences come from?



Bicchieri 2017



Bicchieri 2006





Bicchieri 2017: 41


***WHERE DO SOCIAL NORMS FIT
INTO OR CHALLENGE CURRENT
MODELS OF COMMUNICATION?***

HOW DOES COMMUNICATION WORK?

- ▶ One answer comes from the 'Standard Model' (Grice, Lewis, Stalnaker):
 - ▶ Getting people to believe things by saying something, and meaning it.
- ▶ Tools used in this model:
 - ▶ Signalling Conventions (Lewis 1969)
 - ▶ Communicative intentions / speaker meaning (Grice 1957)
 - ▶ Common ground / conversational score (Stalnaker 1978, Lewis 1979)
 - ▶ Model of practical interactive rationality (e.g. game theory)




COMMON GROUND



Standard Model

CG



COMMON INTEREST

COMMON INTEREST CONSTRAINT (STALNAKER 2014: 42)

...[C]ommon interest and common knowledge are necessary for the possibility of communication. Only against a relatively rich background of common belief is it possible to get people to recognize the very specific intentions that must be recognized for successful acts of meaning, and only where there are mutually recognized common interests will the recognition of the intentions be effective in changing beliefs.



- ▶ **Standard Model assumes communication is possible only when speaker and hearer have a common interest in particular belief being transmitted.**
 - ▶ **See also Godfrey-Smith & Martinez (2013)**

COMMON INTEREST

THE STANDARD MODEL

Communication involves transmission of belief via communicative intentions, relying on common ground (CG):

1. It's CG that speaker intended for hearer to form a belief p by recognizing speaker's intention to do so.
2. It's CG that it's in everyone's best-interest for belief p to be shared




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QUICK COUNTEREXAMPLE





Social Normative Model



CG



Norms of Communication




$$p = || \textit{It is February} ||$$

X

Y



**Common
interests
mediated by
Social Norms**



ARGUING FOR THE NORMATIVE MODEL


- ▶ Standard Model assumes common interests required for communication 'just exist'.
- ▶ Social norms work by warping our divergent interests into 'common ones' (caveats to follow); they 'manufacture common interests'
- ▶ Starr (MS. Chs.1-2) argues this plays a central role in communication.
 - ▶ This is the best explanation of why people communicate even when they don't appear to have common interests, as in social dilemmas (see Dawes 1980, Sally 1995, Balliet 2010, Bicchieri 2006)

NORMS OF COMMUNICATION (STARR MS.)

- ▶ Prescribed scripts of production and uptake (consumption)
- ▶ E.g. speaker to provide information in certain contexts, and hearer is to believe it — nothing special about assertion though.
- ▶ Actual norms are an empirical matter to be investigated using methods developed by Bicchieri et. al.

THE EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT

- ▶ There is some empirical confirmation of the Standard Model!
 - ▶ E.g. Scott-Phillips et. al. (2009)
- ▶ Their experimental paradigm shows exactly how the common interest constraint operates in the standard model
- ▶ But is that constraint correct?



Signalling signalhood and the emergence of communication

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

ABSTRACT

A unique hallmark of human language is that it uses signals that are both learnt and symbolic. The emergence of such signals was therefore a defining event in human cognitive evolution, yet very little is known about how such a process occurs. Previous work provides some insights on how meaning can become attached to form, but a more foundational issue is presently unaddressed. How does a signal signal its own signalhood? That is, how do humans even know that communicative behaviour is indeed communicative in nature? We introduce an experimental game that has been designed to tackle this problem. We find that it is commonly resolved with a bootstrapping process, and that this process influences the final form of the communication system. Furthermore, sufficient common ground is observed to be integral to the recognition of signalhood, and the emergence of dialogue is observed to be the key step in the development of a system that can be employed to achieve shared goals.

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Player 1 Viewpoint





- Remotely played via computer
- Can see:
 - Locations of both avatars
 - Color of P1's squares
- Can't see:
 - Color of P2's squares
- Possible Actions:
 - Move P1 avatar    
- Goal: color-match locations





Points in succession: 0 Highest: 0

Press space when you're finished

Player 2 Viewpoint

- Remotely played via computer
- Can see:
 - Locations of both avatars
 - Color of P2's squares
- Can't see:
 - Color of P1's squares
- Possible Actions:
 - Move P2 avatar    
- Goal: color-match locations




Points in succession: 0 Highest: 0

Press space when you're finished


THE COLOR-MATCHING GAME

- ① Players participate remotely via computer.
- ② No ability to exchange text, talk, or see each other.
- ③ Color matches earn players an equal cash prize.
 - Non-matches earn nothing.
- ④ Game is played repeatedly w/same partner.
- ⑤ Colors randomly distributed at start of each round.
- ⑥ All of this information is presented to participants before agreeing to play.





Move & stop (default strategy)



(Scott-Phillips et. al. 2009)



Oscillations



Loop



C-shape





Fig. 2. A typical emergent system. In this communication system red is the default colour. If participants have a red square, they move to it and wait. If they do not have red they will signal one of the other colours by using the movements indicated. If one participant signals a colour that the other participant also has, that participant will move to the relevant square and hit space to end their turn. Otherwise, the participants will signal alternative colours until an agreement is reached. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

(Scott-Phillips et. al. 2009)

- 12 pairs, played an average of 207 rounds
 - 7 reported some communicative success
 - Scores: 83, 66, 54, 49, 39, 17, 14
 - 5 reported none
 - Scores: 7, 5, 4, 3, 3
 - 5 of 7 successful cases evolved as above
 - 2 others were unilaterally imposed by one player, until the other recognized it (54, 39)

COMMON INTEREST AGAIN

My actions

Your actions

	You go to Red (R_y)	You go to Blue (B_y)
I go to Red (R_i)	1, 1	0, 0
I go to Blue (B_i)	0, 0	1, 1

Four Possible Outcomes

Table: Partial Payoff Matrix for Signaling Game

- Color-matching: $\langle R_i, R_y \rangle$ or $\langle B_i, B_y \rangle$

Format:
(Value-for-me, Value-for-you)

COMMON INTEREST AGAIN

	You go to Red (R_y)	You go to Blue (B_y)
I go to Red (R_i)	1, 1	0, 0
I go to Blue (B_i)	0, 0	1, 1

Table: Partial Payoff Matrix for Signaling Game

- Color-matching: $\langle R_i, R_y \rangle$ or $\langle B_i, B_y \rangle$
- *Nash Equilibria*: if they color-match, no agent can do better by changing their action alone.
- *Rational Choice Theory*: agents maximize (expected) utility (more or less).

COMMON INTEREST AGAIN

Mutual Interest Constraint

An utterance can rationally communicate a belief p between X and Y only if:

- 1 The outcome of X and Y both believing p is a Nash Equilibrium
- 2 1 above is common knowledge between X and Y .
- 3 And it is common knowledge between X and Y that X and Y are rational.

BREAKING COMMON INTERESTS

	You go to Red (R_y)	You go to Blue (B_y)
I go to Red (R_i)	2, 2	0, 3
I go to Blue (B_i)	3, 0	1, 1

Table: Partial Payoff Matrix for Signaling Dilemma

- One Nash Equilibrium: $\langle B_i, B_y \rangle$

BREAKING COMMON INTERESTS

	You go to Red (R_y)	You go to Blue (B_y)
I go to Red (R_i)	2, 2	0, 3
I go to Blue (B_i)	3, 0	1, 1

Table: Partial Payoff Matrix for Signaling Dilemma

- One Nash Equilibrium: $\langle B_i, B_y \rangle$
 - Prisoner's Dilemma! Rational agents all go to blue, even though it is socially suboptimal.
- *Prediction:* it will be impossible to communicate belief that I will go to red.

BREAKING COMMON INTERESTS

	R_y	B_y	G_y	Y_y	End
R_i	2, 2	0, 3	0, 3	0, 3	1, 1
B_i	3, 0	2, 2	0, 3	0, 3	1, 1
G_i	3, 0	3, 0	2, 2	0, 3	1, 1
Y_i	3, 0	3, 0	3, 0	2, 2	1, 1
End	1, 1	1, 1	1, 1	1, 1	1, 1

Table: Complete Payoff Matrix for Signaling Dilemma

- One Nash Equilibrium: $\langle \text{End}, \text{End} \rangle$
- *Prediction:* communication is impossible; even if subjects could talk and say ‘I will go to red’.

THE STANDARD MODEL

Interim Summary

- The Standard Rationalist Model requires mutually recognized common interest in belief being communicated.
- Scott-Phillips et al. (2009) do not test this assumption.
 - What happens when cash prizes are restructured to form a social dilemma?
- To my knowledge, this particular experiment has not been performed.
- But, there is an extensive literature on communication in social dilemmas.

COMMUNICATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS

- *Terminology:*
 - ‘Common interests’: same preferred outcome
 - ‘Social dilemma’: socially suboptimal NE/no NE.
- Can communication occur in social dilemmas?
- What do humans actually do?
- They communicate, contra Standard Model!
 - Dawes (1980), Sally (1995), Balliet (2010)
- Even in ‘one-off’ dilemmas, allowing subjects to talk and make commitments increases cooperation significantly.

SOCIAL DILEMMA

Givers	Payoff to Keep	Payoff to Give
5	–	\$12
4	\$20	\$9
3	\$17	\$7
2	\$14	\$3
1	\$11	\$0
0	\$8	–

Table: Payoffs for Individual in ‘Give Some’ Game (Dawes 1980)

- 5 subjects given \$8, one-off choice to keep or give away
 - If they give away: everyone else gets \$3
 - If everyone gives away: everyone gets \$12
- Each subject’s payoff depends on what others do

COMMUNICATING, STILL

- Across many studies, meta-studies
 - E.g. Dawes (1980), Sally (1995), Balliet (2010)
- Baseline cooperation rate (give): $\approx 50\%$
 - Contra classical game-theory
- If choices are discussed, and commitments/promises made, cooperation significantly increases ($\approx 40\%$)
 - Contra standard model
- If anything, a subject saying 'I will give' is evidence that they will defect (keep money).

OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Key Findings

- ① Discussion has “a strong positive effect on cooperation in a broad range of social dilemmas” (Balliet 2010: 46)
 - $d = 1.01$, 95% CI, LL = 0.82, UL = 1.20
- ② Effect stronger when face-to-face (Balliet 2010: 46)
- ③ Discussions primarily result in promises/commitments.
- ④ Effect correlated with unanimity of commitments.
- ⑤ Most likely when ‘group leaders’ emerge in discussion.

Dawes (1980), Sally (1995), Bicchieri (2006: Ch.4), Balliet (2010)

EXPLAINING THE RESULTS

		Y	
		<i>Give</i>	<i>Keep</i>
X	<i>Give</i>	(4,4)	(0,5)
	<i>Keep</i>	(5,0)	(3,3)

Table: Give-Some Social Dilemma Payoff Matrix

		Y	
		<i>Give</i>	<i>Keep</i>
X	<i>Give</i>	(4,4)	()
	<i>Keep</i>	()	(3,3)

Table: Give-Some Social Dilemma under Commitment Norm

RETHINKING THE GAME

		Y	
		<i>Give</i>	<i>Keep</i>
X	<i>Give</i>	(4,4)	(0,5)
	<i>Keep</i>	(5,0)	(3,3)

Table: Give-Some Social Dilemma Payoff Matrix

		Y	
		<i>Give</i>	<i>Keep</i>
X	<i>Give</i>	(4,4)	(0,2)
	<i>Keep</i>	(2,0)	(3,3)

Table: Give-Some Social Dilemma under Commitment Norm

HOW DO NORMS WORK?

The Force of Norms

Normative expectations re-weight utilities toward compliance, but how exactly?


Sanctions in Repeated Games

Cooperative norms are stable under certain social conditions not just because sanctions enforce compliance now, but future interactions provide indefinite opportunity to sanction.
(Axelrod 1984)


- **Limitation:** people still comply in one-off games!

SOCIAL NORMS AND SANCTIONS

- ▶ **Social norms can produce pro-social behavior even when other means fail.**
 - ▶ **E.g. reciprocation, reputation don't work to maintain queuing in typical human populations**
- ▶ **If social norms are empirical and normative expectations, how do people learn these preferences?**
- ▶ **Internalized sanctioning (Horne 2003, Bicchieri 2004: Ch.4)**
 - ▶ **Some: sanctioning by those in close-knit social groups.**
 - ▶ **Most: observed sanctioning leads to self-sanctioning**
 - ▶ **“The perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary.” (Foucault 1979: 201)**



Bicchieri 2017






Bicchieri 2006

GENERALIZING THE NORMATIVE MODEL

NORMS OF COMMUNICATION (STARR MS.)

- ▶ Prescribed scripts of production and uptake (consumption)
 - ▶ E.g. speaker to provide information in certain contexts, and hearer is to believe it — nothing special about assertion though.
 - ▶ Actual norms are an empirical matter to be investigated using methods developed by Bicchieri et. al.
-
- ▶ Norms of communication manufacture the ‘common interests’ required for communication; they are an evolved cultural tool.
 - ▶ Implementation: sub-personal, contextual, stereotypical, social scripts, e.g. in C, X does A with Y (Eickers 2023)
 - ▶ Scripts, in fact, constitute a legitimate alternative to ‘theory of mind’ accounts of social cognition and coordination (Eickers forthcoming)
 - ▶ They are not part of the common ground; but they do interact w/CG.

NORMS OF COMMUNICATION



2


CASE STUDIES

Conversational Injustice




INSTRUCTOR SOAP BOX

- ▶ The instructor who uses the classroom to demonstrate and promote their reputation
- ▶ They may not even realize they are doing this!
- ▶ Suppose they were trained to speak in a work culture that valued those demonstrations, while being given little training in teaching/instruction.
- ▶ Students have very little recourse to sanction these violations effectively




TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE

- ▶ Fricker (2007) presents to central cases
 - ▶ E.g. Marge in *Talented Mr. Ripley*, Tom Robinson in *To Kill a Mockingbird*
- ▶ Empirically well-researched example (McCaffrey & Ferrell 1992, Hoffman & Tarzian 2001):
 - ▶ Womens' self-reports of pain are less likely to be acted on by medical professional than mens'
 - ▶ Correlates with caregiver biases such as *women are more likely to report pain, more likely to experience pain, less tolerant of 'minor pains'*.
- ▶ Fricker (2007) analyses this as arising from a credibility deficit.



DISCURSIVE INJUSTICE

- ▶ **Kukla's (2014) Celia case:**
 - ▶ **Celia is floor manager at factory where 95% of the workers are male**
 - ▶ **Her job description gives her authority to give workers on the floor orders**
 - ▶ **Compliance is low, and her reputation is poor**
 - ▶ **Workers are not consciously acting on misogynistic beliefs**
 - ▶ **They just 'see' her orders are requests, despite her having conventional authority.**
 - ▶ **E.g. "Email me your reports by 1:30pm."**



COMMUNICATIVE WARPING



hannah moskowitz  @hannahmosk · 17h

do men know how many times we rewrite tweets to make SURE it doesn't look like we're asking for advice

and how much advice we still get

 54  261  1.6K 



Attractive Lemon @Lemonanyway · 6h

The best way to avoid this is to not present something as a problem. Because if you do then people will instinctively try to solve it.

 4   

<https://twitter.com/Lemonanyway/status/926155375270821888>




► **Manne's (2020: Ch.8) similar mansplaining cases:**

- **Paul Bullen tweets correcting sex educator Laura Dodsworth on 'vulva' vs. 'vagina'.**
- **Solnit's NYC literary old boy explaining her own work to her by accident.**

ILLOCUTIONARY DISABLEMENT

- ▶ Langton (1993, 2018) on sexual refusals:
 - ▶ Rape culture has an illocutionary component, e.g. 'No means yes'.
 - ▶ This prevents women's sexual refusals from getting uptake.
- ▶ Similarly, Langton (1993) on Lovelace's *Ordeal* (1980)
 - ▶ Lovelace wrote it as an exposé and protest of the violence she endured while filming *Deep Throat*
 - ▶ However, *Ordeal* got co-opted by the pornography industry and its consumers where it was consumed as a 'dark erotic thriller'

3 NORM-BASED ANALYSIS And Practical Implications







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NORMS OF COMMUNICATION




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
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TWO KEY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

- ▶ **Psychologically, social norms are selectively triggered by (Bicchieri 2006: Ch.2) unconscious:**
 - ▶ **Scripts:** stereotypical representations of social interactions (Schank & Abelson 1977, Eickers 2023a, b)
 - ▶ **Schemas:** stereotypical representations of roles (Goffman 1959, Bern 1983, Rentsch et. al. 2019)
- ▶ **Lots of inter-individual variation in compliance and sanctioning behavior; known factors:**
 - ▶ **Social & Self-image** (Gross & Vostroknutov 2022)
 - ▶ **Social Power** (van Kleef et. al. 2015, Winter & Zhang 2018)



Bicchieri 2017



Bicchieri 2006


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PREDICTION

- ▶ Social elites are perceived as more stereotypical, e.g. competent (Connor, Varney & Chen 2020)
- ▶ So anything they do tends to be seen as 'closer' to the stereotypical ideal
- ▶ Combined with reduced sanctioning of social elites, this gives elites enhanced power over social norms
- ▶ So elites will shape them more to their interests than others' simply by doing what they do.
- ▶ In short, elite capture (Táiwò 2022) of social norms.
- ▶ This means there will be a perpetual struggle (Tessman 2005) for non-dominant groups against social norms



1**2****3**

TRENDSETTERS

- ▶ **However, elite capture of social norms *can* be coopted for good.**
 - ▶ **The ethics of this are... complicated...**
- ▶ **Trendsetters (famous 'first-movers') can establish new scripts for social interaction**
 - ▶ **E.g. Bicchieri (2017) on impact of gay characters in Indian soaps**
- ▶ **Since trendsetters dominate in the attention economy anyway, they are natural agents for introducing new scripts and practices**
- ▶ **Note that this extends to media produced by trendsetters, featuring marginalized characters/stories**

1**2****3**

INSTITUTIONS AND CHANGE

- ▶ **Social organizations that are explicitly involved in 'culture building' already, can integrate norm-change into their training and practices**
 - ▶ **Companies, schools, agencies, social clubs, recurrent parties, hobby groups**
- ▶ **By setting expectations about 'how things are done here' they can instill new practices that surprisingly bleed over into everyday life (Bicchieri 2017, Ch.5)**

1**2****3**

PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE

SOCIAL NORMS (BICCHIERI 2006, 2017)

▶ Social Norms consist in preferences to do A when one believes:

1. Empirical: most of 'us' do A in this situation.
2. Normative: most of 'us' believe we ought to do A in this situation.

- ▶ Social norms can persist even when they are oppressive and unpopular.
- ▶ These conditions are consistent with most people privately hating doing A
 - ▶ This is called 'Pluralistic Ignorance' (Bicchieri 2017, Ch.3)
- ▶ Common example: corporal punishment of children
- ▶ Can be addressed simply by *awareness raising*
 - ▶ By people publicly talking out against the practice and soliciting consensus

1

2

3

INTERVENTIONS

- 1. Trendsetters**
- 2. Awareness campaigns**
- 3. Institutional 'culture building'**

1**2****3**

RETURN TO EXAMPLES

- 1. Instructor Soap Box**
- 2. Medical Bias (Self-Reports of Pain)**
- 3. Workplace Bias (Celia Case)**
- 4. Unsolicited Advice ('AttractiveLemon')**
- 5. Sexual Refusals ('No means yes')**
- 6. Co-option of Protest (*Ordeal*)**


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NORM-BASED ANALYSIS

- ▶ Instructor lacks appropriate scripts and norms – repurposes others
- ▶ But cannot be effectively steered onto appropriate norms/scripts
- ▶ For at least some instructors, this can be addressed by offering alternatives.
- ▶ Likely requires institutional interventions
 - ▶ Focused on aligning instruction with students' needs (Freire 1970)
 - ▶ Rather than instructor/societal needs
- ▶ Viability of alternatives may vary with subject matter, e.g. philosophy vs. math



1**2****3**

NORM-BASED ANALYSIS

- ▶ **Medical providers' schemas and stereotypes influence not just what they believe about women's credibility as knowers (cf. Fricker)**
- ▶ **Much more general than credibility deficit (see Táiwò 2022)**
 - ▶ **Scripts/norms/stereotypes that portray women as overly sensitive, weak, fragile, etc.**
 - ▶ **But also: as 'complainers'**
- ▶ **Rough script representation: 'Woman reports pain' + 'Women are overly sensitive' + 'Women complain' -> 'Woman is complaining about routine pain'**

1**2****3**

NORM-BASED ANALYSIS

- ▶ **Woman not seeking advice, Attractive Lemon gives it anyway.**
- ▶ **Consumption and production norms are triggered by scripts and schemas.**
 - ▶ **'Woman' + 'Has a problem' -> 'woman needs help'**
 - ▶ **'Woman needs advice' + 'male authority' -> 'man advises woman'**
 - ▶ **Analysis of 'male authority' Manne (2020, Ch.8)**
- ▶ **Similarly for Celia:**
 - ▶ **'Woman' + 'issues direction' + 'women are kind' -> 'request'**
 - ▶ **Beats out 'Woman' + 'issues direction' + 'has formal authority' -> 'order'**
 - ▶ **Why? Celia's womanhood is more salient than her leadership role.**
 - ▶ **More details about this dynamic are needed!**

1**2****3**



PRACTICAL UPSHOTS

- ▶ **Main mechanisms for change on this normative framework:**
 - ▶ **Awareness raising to fight pluralistic ignorance about existing norms**
 - ▶ **New scripts!**
 - ▶ **Trendsetters to enact those scripts**
 - ▶ **Not just representation, also social interpretation!**
- ▶ **Main challenges:**
 - ▶ **Stakeholder analysis of script design**
 - ▶ **Underlying psychological/representational features of scripts poorly studied**



4 INTEGRATION

With Previous Analyses



1**2****3****4**

INTEGRATION



- ▶ How does this differ from other normative/pragmatist theories?
 - ▶ E.g. Peirce (1932), Brandom (1983), Kukla & Lance (2009), Tirrell (2012), McGowan (2004, 2019)
- ▶ These accounts characterize speech acts in terms of how they transform normative statuses
 - ▶ E.g. speaker's responsibility, hearer's license
- ▶ My social normative account offers an account of what communicative norms are and this allows us to diagnose
 - ▶ But it's also worthwhile seeing how things go when normative status are basic!
- ▶ My social normative account can say more about an issue McGowan (2019) does not fully answer: what mechanisms relate local communicative norms and general ones? (Thanks to Adriene Takaoka for highlighting this issue)


1**2****3****4**

INTEGRATION



- ▶ **What about conventionalist accounts?**
 - ▶ **E.g. Austin (1956), Lewis (1979), Langton (1993, 2018)**
- ▶ **These accounts struggle with cases like Kukla's (2014) Celia case, Lemon Twitter case and Soap Box Instructor**
 - ▶ **E.g. speaker satisfies conventions, still doesn't get uptake**
- ▶ **They also struggle with the authority problem (Maitra 2012, Bauer 2015)**
 - ▶ **Many forms of problematic speech operate in the absence of conventional authority**
- ▶ **By replacing 'conventions of accommodation' with norms of communication**
 - ▶ **It looks possible to preserve the insights of these accounts without inheriting some major challenges.**
 - ▶ **Related conjecture: accommodation is a norm of communication**

THANK YOU!



Special thanks for conversations and inspiration: audiences @ SLIME 2 and Berlin Workshop on Speech and Harm, Kate Manne, Sally McConnell-Ginet, Sarah Murray, Shaun Nichols, Carlotta Pavese, Alejandro Vesga, Adriene Takaoka, and my Spring 2023 seminar @ Cornell.

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